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1. INTRODUCTION
"[Congress,] you did not mean what the Court said. So fix it. "
Answering Justice Ginsburg's call to action and correcting the injustice
against women's rights, Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
(LLFPA) 2 to amend the Court's "cramped" and "parsimonious"
interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 9643 in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.4 The LLFPA essentially creates a new statute
of limitations regime for one class of cases, pay discrimination, 5 but the
inclusion of the terms "other practices" in the statute's language begs the
question: did Congress intend the Act to apply more broadly?6 The courts are
beginning to answer this question and have come to vastly different
conclusions. 7
The courts' broad and inconsistent interpretation of the Act appears to
stem primarily from the fact that pay discrimination claims are often
intertwined with other discrimination claims, such as a failure to promote or
1 Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,
89 B.U. L. REv. 539, 542 (2009) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebration Fifty-Five:
A Public Conversation Between Dean Elena Kagan '86 and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
'56-'58 at the Harvard Law School Women's Leadership Summit (Sept. 20, 2008) (from
notes taken by and on file with author)).
2 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The Act was signed into law
on January 29, 2009. See Gail Collins, Lilly's Big Day, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2009, at
A27; Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady's Hand in It, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2009, at COI; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/Us/politics/30ledbetter-
web.html.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
4~ Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
5 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5, 5
(2009) ("The Supreme Court in Ledbetter ... significantly impairs statutory protections
against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have been
bedrock principles of American law for decades.").
6 See Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead? The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84
TuL. L. REv. 499, 527 (2010) (noting that one factor in the LLFPA achieving its full
potential will depend on how the courts interpret "other practices").
7 See infra Part VI.
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hire, with the courts left to resolve the complexity of this interconnectivity
independently. While the convoluted nature of pay discrimination claims
may explain the courts' broad interpretation and inconsistent application of
the LLFPA to statute of limitations issues, awareness of the problem is not
enough; a predictable approach for applying the LLFPA is necessary to
protect the interests of employees, employers, and society as a whole. 8
This Note analyzes and compares the courts' interpretation and
application of the LLFPA, and offers a balanced solution that protects the
interests of both the employee and employer. Part 11 begins by providing the
background of Lilly Ledbetter's personal story, which establishes a context
for discussing the principals and policies of Title Vii's 180-day filing period.
Part III briefly describes the development of Title VII's 180-day filing period
and, in addition, provides an overview of the seminal cases interpreting Title
VII's statute of limitations.
The Court's controversial and deeply divided decision in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., in which it applied Title VII's statute of
limitations to a compensation claim, is then addressed in Part WV. Congress's
response to the injustice of the Ledbetter decision, the enactment of the
LLFPA, is reviewed in Part V. Part VI then analyzes and compares the
courts' interpretation and application of the LLFPA and also examines the
intended scope of the legislation. A solution, the Three-Step Analytical
Framework, is then presented and discussed in Part VII, which reconciles the
inconsistencies in the courts' application of the LLFPA and reestablishes a
balance between the employee's and employer's interests, as noted in the
conclusion to this Note in Part VIII.
Lilly Ledbetter's story precipitated the legislation the, courts are now
broadly and inconsistently interpreting. 9 The insidious and subtle
discrimination Lilly Ledbetter experienced is exactly the type of
discrimination Title VII was intended to redress,' 0 and the enactment of the
8 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50
WM. & MARY L. Ri~v. 607, 617-18 (noting that statute of limitations may further the
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society in two ways: (1) by helping to ensure
the accuracy of adjudication, "without which the adjudication of claims on their
substantive merits would arguably possess little societal value" and (2) by encouraging
defendants to timely file meritorious claims, "so as to maximize both the compensatory
value and the deterrent value of the litigation of claims"); 1 CALviN W. CoRMAN,
LimrrA'rlONS of ACTIONS 11-14 (199 1) (discussing how the legislature must weigh the
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society when determining a statute of
limitations period).
9 e infra Part VI.
10 While Title VII has helped to address the inequities in our workforce, pay
disparities still exist. See Statemnent from US. Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis on Equal
Pay, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., (Apr. 28, 2009),
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LLFPA was necessary to tear down the additional roadblock the Ledbetter
decision added on the path to equality. 11 The lessons learned from
Ledbetter's story reinforce both the importance of the policy reasons for Title
V11's statute of limitations-maintaining a balance between employer and
employee interests' 2-and the need for a predictable analytical framework
when applying the LLFPA to pay discrimination claims.'13
11. LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER Co.:
LILLY LEDBETTER'S STORY
"I wish my story had a happy ending. But it doesn 't. I hope ... in the
future, what happened to me does not happen to other people who suffer
discrimination like I did. "14
Just before Lilly Ledbetter planned to retire in 1998, after nineteen years
of employment with Goodyear, she received an anonymous tip that she was
being paid less than men in the same position.15 Ledbetter filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint upon receiving the
news and later sued Goodyear in federal court to enforce her right to equal
pay for equal work,' 6 alleging that a series of discriminatory pay decisions
resulted in her being paid considerably less than males in the same position. 17
Ledbetter brought a Title VII disparate treatment claim against Goodyear
for the "unlawful employment practice" of discriminating against her
http://www.dol.govi/opa/media/press/wb/wb20090469.htm (noting that women earn
seventy-eight cents for every dollar a man earns, with women of color earning even less).
11 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 645 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing on the practical aspects of Ledbetter's case, Ginsburg
noted that pay disparities often occur in small increments, comparative pay information is
often not available to employees, and employees are not likely to bring a federal case
against an employer when it is likely the employee "is averse to making waves" in a
nontraditional work environment such as Ledbetter's).
12 See CoRMAN, supra note 8, at 11-14 (discussing how the legislature must assess
the subject and the purpose of a specific statute in order to identify an appropriate statute
of limitations period to balance the interests of potential litigants); infra Part 111.
13 The predictable analytical framework is presented in the solution section of this
Note. See infra Part VII.
14 Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court's Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Employment Discrimination Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
110th Cong. 11 (2007) (prepared statement of Lilly Ledbetter) [hereinafter Ledbetter
House Hearing].
15 See id. at 12 (noting that at retirement, Ledbetter was making "twenty-percent less
than the lowest paid male supervisor in the same position").
16 See id
17 Id.
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because of her sex. 18 Under Title VII, Ledbetter had the burden of persuasion
that the differential treatment of paying her less than a similarly situated man
was rooted in discriminatory intent. 19 A jury awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in
back pay and more than $3 million in punitive damages for her injuries after
finding that it was "more likely than not" that Ledbetter was paid an unequal
salary by Goodyear because of her sex.20
Goodyear appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, which, departing from the rulings of nine other federal
appellate courts, 21 found that Ledbetter's suit was brought too late. 22
Ledbetter's case turned on whether her EEOC complaint was timely filed
within the 180-day filing period. 23 The circuit court found that her complaint
was not timely filed, noting that while an employee may receive a paycheck
reflecting the result of a discriminatory pay decision within the 180-day
filing period, the actual discriminatory decision to pay Ledbetter less fell
outside the filing period. 24 Ledbetter argued that paychecks received within
18 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624 (2007)
("Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central element of which is discriminatory
intent."). A disparate-treatment claim comprises of two elements: an employment
practice and discriminatory intent. Id. at 631. Ledbetter could have avoided proving
discriminatory intent if she brought a disparate impact claim but likely would have had
difficulty due to the fact that Goodyear's pefformance-based pay system appeared
facially neutral and therefore not susceptible to claims that it adversely affected members
of protected groups. Additionally, Ledbetter likely brought a disparate treatment claim
instead of a disparate impact claim because compensatory and punitive damages are
available only for disparate treatment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006) (allowing for
compensatory and punitive damages to be sought against an employer "who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact)").
19 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 659 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 644 (quoting record from below).
21 See id. at 654-55 (citing appellate court decisions supporting the opposite
conclusion of the 11Ith Circuit and the majority's decision in Ledbetter); Brief for the
Petitioner at 13, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-
1074) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner] (citing that the majority of the courts of
appeals and the EEOC had recognized that "Morgan and Bazemore establish the timely
filing requirements for disparate pay claims under Title VII: each paycheck that offers a
woman less pay than a similarly situated man because of her sex is a separate violation of
Title VII with its own limitations period, regardless of whether the paycheck simply
implements a prior discriminatory decision made outside the limitations period").
22 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11Ith Cir. 2005).
Reversing, the Court of Appeals for the 11Ith Circuit found Ledbetter's claim was time-
barred, relying in part on Goodyear's system of annual merit-based raises. See id. at
1171, 1182-83.
23 Id. at 1171.
2 4 Id. at 117 8-80.
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the 180-day period were actionable because they "implement [ed] a prior
discriminatory decision." 25 Grounding her argument in the "paycheck accrual
rule," 26 Ledbetter argued that because her paychecks reflected an intentional
discriminatory pay decision, they were actionable despite the lack of present
discriminatory intent within the 180-day filing period. 2 7 Ruling against
precedent of most circuit courts, 28 the I11th Circuit found that because
Ledbetter did not file a claim when the discriminatory decision to pay her
less occurred, her claim was untimely. 29
The 11Ith Circuit concluded Ledbetter's claim was untimely even though
she had no way of knowing of the discriminatory pay decision at the time it
was made. 30 She was barred from bringing her claim of discrimination
because she failed to file a complaint with the EEOC for a discriminatory act
that she had absolutely no notice of when it occurred.3' To understand how
the 11Ith Circuit arrived at this harsh conclusion, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Supreme Court, it is necessary to review the policy behind
Title VII's 180-day filing period and, in addition, to review the Supreme
Court's precedent in interpreting when a discriminatory act triggers this 180-
day filing period.
111. TITLE VII'S 180-DAY FILING PERIOD AND ITS
COURT-IDENTIFIED TRIGGERS
A. Title VII's 180-Day Filing Period and the Development of the
"Continuing Effects Doctrine "
According to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
"6against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation ... because
25 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2 1, at 13.
26 See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
"paycheck accrual rule" finds its source in the dicta of Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion: "Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated
white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was
begun prior to the effective date of Title VII." Id. at 3 95-96.
2 7 See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1181.
28 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
29 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1189.
3Id;see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 645 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Comparative pay information ... is often hidden from the
employee's view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials maintained
among supervisors. . . .)
31 See Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 11I (prepared statement of Lilly
Ledbetter).
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of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."132 This
statutory prohibition against intentional discrimination applies to facially
neutral employment practices that have a disparate impact on a protected
group. 33 It is necessary for an employee to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a suit against an employer under Title VII.34 As part of its
administrative requirements, an individual must file a complaint with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or
within 300 days if the claim goes directly to a state agency.35 The 180-day
filing period serves as a statute of limitations because if an employee fails to
file an EEOC claim within the statutory filing period, the employee is
precluded from later challenging the alleged discriminatory employment
practice in court.36
Title VII's requisite 180-day filing period functions as a remedial
measure to protect the interests of both the employer and employee. 37 It
reflects a policy decision that 180 days is enough time to recognize and bring
a claim of discrimination, furthering the plaintiffs and society's interests in
having claims prosecuted while also being a short enough period to protect
the defendant, the court, and society from wasting time and resources
litigating old claims. 38 In addition to eliminating the employer's burden of
defending against old claims,39 the 180-day period encourages claims of
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Specifically, section (a)(1) of the Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer .. . to fail or refuise to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id § 2000e-2(a)(1).
33 See generally BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DIsCRUMINATioN LAW 1-12 (1 st ed. 1976).
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
35 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-26 1, § 4(a), 86 Stat.
103, 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006)).
36 See Wistrich, supra note 8, at 609-10 (defining a statute of limitation as the
deadline by which a claimant must file a lawsuit, after which the right to a decision on the
merits and eligibility for a remedy are forfeited).
37 See Joseph M. Aldridge, Note, Pay-Setting Decisions as Discrete Acts: The Court
Sharpens Its Focus on Intent in Title VllActions in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 86 NEB. L. Rrv. 955, 956 (2007) (noting how discriminatory pay-setting decisions
can present unique challenges to both employees and employers).
38 CORMAN, supra note 8,at § 1. 1.
39 See Wistrich, supra note 8, at 616-18 (noting that policies providing strong
support for limiting civil actions include: (1) promoting repose, (2) minimizing
2010] 251
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discrimination to be brought as soon as possible, protecting employees by
ensuring evidence and witnesses in support of the claim are preserved and
reliable. 40 Therefore, as recognized by the Court in Ledbetter, the 180-day
EEOC filing period is really a reflection of Congress's intent to encourage
the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination, which is
in the interests of both the employee and employer. 4 '
It is important to note that the 180-day filing period is an extension from
Title VII's original ninety-day filing period for charges of discrimination. 42
Recognizing the harsh effects the original ninety-day filing period had on
employees, Congress reevaluated the interests of the employee, the
employer, and society and found the balance was better struck by extending
the filing period from ninety to 180 days. 43 Prior to Congress extending the
filing period to 180 days, courts had adopted the "continuing effects
doctrine" to soften the effects the strict application of the ninety-day filing
period posed.44 Under the "continuing effects doctrine," the courts allowed a
claim of discrimination to be brought outside the statutory time limit to
account for situations, such as Lilly Ledbetter's, where it was difficult for the
employee to discern when the discriminatory acts took place. 45 The
deterioration of evidence, (3) encouraging the prompt enforcement of substantive law,
and (4) avoiding the retrospective application of contemporary standards).
4 01Id.
41 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630-31 (2007).
42 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 241, 260
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (2006)).
43 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86
Stat. 103, 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006)). At the same
time, Congress also expanded the state filing limit with fair employment agencies from
180 days to 300 days. Id
44The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116 HARv. L. REv. 200, 352,
357 (2002); see also Michael Lee Wright, Civil Rights-Time Limitations for Civil Rights
Claims-Continuing Violations Doctrine, 71 TENN. L. REv. 3 83, 3 85 n. 15 (2004). Wright
noted:
Federal courts "began to refuse to automatically dismiss" belated discrimination
claims for three main reasons. First, the purpose of Title VII is to "root out
discrimination and make injured parties whole." Second, various reasons exist for
why employees might not file a discrimination claim within the time prescribed by
statute, some of which justify extending opportunities for relief to employees. For
instance, employees may not know of the time limitation for filing the complaint.
Also, employees may fear retaliation and thus refrain from promptly filing
discrimination complaints. Finally, it may be difficult to discern when the
discriminatory acts took place. The Sumner court found that many discriminatory
acts could be described as "unfoldling] rather than occurring]."
Wright, supra, at 3 85 n. 15 (citations omitted).
45 Wright, supra note 44, at 385 n. 15.
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application of the "continuing effects doctrine" and its effect on Title Vii's
statute of limitations is at the core of both the Ledbetter decision, as well as
Congress's subsequent decision to enact the LLFPA.
To understand the split in the courts' application of the "continuing
effects doctrine" and its effect on the 180-day filing period in pay
discrimination claims, 46 it is necessary to review the Supreme Court
precedent that created the ambiguity and which ultimately led to the
Ledbetter decision.
B. The "Continuing Effects Doetine ": Laying the Foundation for the
Ledbetter Decision
The divided Ledbetter Court reflects the diverging interpretations of two
previously decided Title VII statute of limitations cases: National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan47 and Bazemore v. Friday.48 The cases establish
the doctrines of "discrete act analysis" and the "paycheck accrual rule,"
respectively, which the lower courts have applied inconsistently and are at
the core of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Ledbetter. Both the majority and the dissent rely on Morgan and Bazemore to
lay the foundation in support of their decisions, which ultimately lead to two
very different conclusions. 49 In order to understand the divergence, a brief
summary of the two doctrines is necessary.
1. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan and the
"Discrete Act Analysis"
The Supreme Court in Morgan first applied the doctrine of "discrete act
analysis" to determine whether a claim of discrimination fell within the 180-
day filing period by categorizing the act as either a "discrete act" or a
"hostile work environment claim." 50 Morgan establishes the difference
between related discriminatory acts that collectively constitute a single cause
of action and discrete discriminatory acts that are considered separate causes
of actions.51 Discrete acts of discrimination, such as termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire constitute unlawful employment
practices under Title VII and trigger the 180-day filing period on the date
46 See discussion and cases cited infra note 72.
47 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
48 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
49 See infra Part WV.
5 0 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-17.
51 See id at 114-15.
2010] 253
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they occur.52 if an employee fails to file a claim within 180 days, he or she is
barred from bringing the action. 53 Addressing the application of the
"6continuing effects doctrine" as an exception to Title V11's 180-day filing
requirement, the Court in Morgan distinguished between actions that are
discrete and actions that make up a hostile work environment. 54 In making
the distinction, the Court noted that "discrete acts, such as termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire," are examples of
employment actions that are "easy to identify" 55 and, therefore, because an
employee is put on notice of the discriminatory act, a claim must be filed
within the 180-day filing period from the day in which it "occur[s]." 56
The Court contrasted the "discrete acts" of a promotion or demotion with
the individual acts making up a "hostile work environment" claim, which
consists of a series of acts that constitute a single violation.57 Arriving at this
distinction, the Court rejected the application of the "continuing effects
theory" to discrete discriminatory acts, which would have allowed an
employment practice that occurred outside the applicable 180-day period to
be actionable if it "related to" a discriminatory act that occurred within the
180-day period. 58 By making this distinction, discrete acts that occurred
outside the 180-day period for filing a claim were time-barred-no matter
how related the act may have been to a later discriminatory act.
The only exception to the "discrete act" analysis is a hostile work
environment claim. 59 In a hostile work environment claim, a complaint is
considered timely as long as the most recent harassing act occurred within
the 180-day filing period.60 Explaining the exception, the Court noted, "[a]
hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that
collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice."' 61 Therefore,
notwithstanding the one exception of a hostile work environment claim, the
general rule that discrete acts cannot be aggregated to toll the statute of
limitations applied in all other cases, a claim of discrimination must be filed
within 180 days of the act occurring.
52 Id. at 114.
5 3 Id at 113.
5 4 Id at 115.
55 1Id at 114.
56 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 n.5.
57Id at 117.
58 See id. at 11 2 ("[D]iscrete acts that fall within the statutory time period do not
make timely acts that fall outside the time period.").
59 Id. at 115.
60 Id. at 117.
61 Id
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As a result of Morgan, an EEOC complaint was considered timely if: (1)
an employee filed a complaint within 180 days of a discrete discriminatory
act;62 or (2) an employee filed a complaint within 180 days of a single act
that comprised a "hostile work environment" claim, even if other acts that
constituted the claim fell outside the 180-day period.63 While Morgan made
the distinction between a discrete discriminatory act and an act comprising a
hostile work environment claim clear for determining the start of the 180-day
filing period, the decision failed to address where a discriminatory pay
decision fell in this categorization.
The unique nature of discriminatory pay claims and their failure to fall
perfectly into one of the two categories identified in Morgan is what
ultimately led to Ledbetter, but in order to fully understand the policy
arguments in Ledbetter's case, the implications of the "paycheck accrual
rule" introduced by the Court in Bazemore must first be discussed.
2. Bazemore v. Friday and the "Paycheck Accrual Rule"
Applying the "continuing effects doctrine" to a discriminatory pay
system, the Court in Bazemore held that the continued application of a
discriminatory pay structure constituted a present violation under Title VII.64
In Bazemore, the Court found that an employer had committed an unlawful
employment practice each time it paid black employees less than similarly
situated white employees. 65 Finding that each week's paycheck delivering
"less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under
Title VII,"166 the Court established what would come to be known as the
"6paycheck accrual rule."167
Courts subsequently interpreted Bazemore as recognizing the realities of
wage discrimination, that regardless of whether the discriminatory decision
to pay an employee less fell outside the 180-day filing period, the wrong was
still actionable because the employer discriminated each time it issued a
paycheck.68 They reasoned that the issuance of each paycheck reflecting an
amount less than that payable to similarly situated employees had an
62 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 1 10.
63 Id. at 118.
64 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 397 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 395-96.
6 6 Id. at 395.
67 I.at 3 95-96.
68 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 654 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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employer adhered to a nondiscriminatory compensation regime constituted a
cognizable harm.69
The Supreme Court's failure to address the correctness of the "paycheck
accrual rule" 70 courts had adopted from the Bazemore ruling set the stage for
inconsistent interpretation and application of Title VII's 180-day filing
period in discriminatory pay claims. This uncertainty of whether Morgan's
"discrete act" analysis applied to claims of pay disparity led to the reversal of
Ledbetter's jury verdict by the 11Ith Circuit, and ultimately to the Supreme
Court granting certiorari to resolve the circuit court split.7 ' In light of the
historical development and purpose of the 180-day filing period, in addition
to the Court's precedent as established by Morgan and Bazemore, the
Supreme Court in Ledbetter attempted to resolve the question of when the
180-day filing period began to toll for pay discrimination claims.72
IV. LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER Co.: A COURT DIVIDED
Echoing the reasoning of nine federal courts of appeals and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 73 the four dissenting
Justices found: "Paychecks perpetuating past discrimination . .. are
actionable not simply because they are 'related' to a decision made outside
the charge-filing period, but because they discriminate anew each time they
issue."74
69 Id. at 654-56 (citing circuit court and EEOC decisions citing Bazemore and
applying the paycheck accrual rule).
7 0 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., concurring).
71 Compare Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1189 (11Ith
Cir. 2005), with Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2006)
(interpreting Bazemore as establishing that "each week's paycheck that delivers less on a
discriminatory basis is a separate Title VII violation"), and Forsyth v. Fed'n Empl. &
Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[E]very paycheck stemming from a
discriminatory pay scale is an actionable discrete discriminatory act.").
72 While the Court's majority did not explicitly address the circuit split at the time of
the Ledbetter decision, a total of nine circuit courts and the EEOC had all determined that
the discrete act analysis did not apply to discriminatory pay claims. See Ledbetter, 550
U.S. at 654-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing federal courts of appeals and EEOC
rulings); see also The Fair Pay Restoration Act: Ensuring Reasonable Rules in Pay
Discrimination Cases: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions,
I1I0th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter Ledbetter Senate Hearing] (opening statement of Hon.
Edward M. Kennedy, Chairmnan, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (noting
the nine circuit courts finding each paycheck to be a discrete discriminatory act).
73 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 654-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing federal court
of appeals and EEOC rulings).
74 Id. at 647.
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A. A Divided Supreme Court: The Ledbetter Majority
In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the plaintiff
may not attribute intent from past discriminatory pay decisions to make the
present effects of such decisions independently actionable under Title VII; in
other words, that the "continuing effects doctrine" did not apply.75 Ruling in
favor of the employer, the Court found Ledbetter's claim untimely because
Goodyear's intentional discriminatory decision to pay her less than similarly
situated males had occurred outside Title VII's 180-day charging period.76
Under Title VII, an employee must file a claim with the EEOC within 180
days of the unlawful employment practice. 77 The slim majority of the Court
found that while Ledbetter filed within 180 days of learning that she received
discriminatory pay from Goodyear, her claim was not timely because she had
failed to file within 180 days of the discriminatory decision to pay her less.7 8
As a result of the decision, Goodyear owed Ledbetter nothing for
discriminating against her on account of her sex. 79 The majority came to its
conclusion by analogizing pay discrimination claims to cases involving fully
communicated public acts of discrimination, such as termination or a denial
of tenure, 80 and thereby failed to acknowledge the differences between these
overt acts and the secretive nature of pay discrimination.8'
The Ledbetter majority, relying on Morgan's discrete act analysis, found
that "because a pay-setting decision is a 'discrete act,' it follows that the
75 Id. at 624 (majority opinion).
7 6 Id. at 633-43.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006) (stating in Section 706(e) of the Act that an
individual must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC "within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," and if the
employee files a charge of discrimination with a state agency with appropriate
jurisdiction, the employee is allowed 300 days to file her charge with the EEOC).
78 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633-43.
79 In support of this result, the Bush Administration filed a Supreme Court amicus
brief arguing that the employee must file a claim within 180 days of the initial
discriminatory decision to pay an employee less, whether or not detectible. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6-8, Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074).
80 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 625-26 (discussing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553, 554 (1977) (female forced to resign due to policy disallowing married
female flight attendants); Del. State Coil. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (decision to deny
tenure)).
81 See Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 13 (statement of Wade
Henderson, President & CEO, Leadership Conf. on Civil Rights) ("As Justice Ginsberg
pointedly emphasized in her dissent, pay discrimination is a hidden discrimination that is
particularly dangerous due to the silence surrounding salary information in the United
States.").
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period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the act occurs." 82 Limiting
Bazemore to discriminatory pay decisions that involve "facially
discriminatory" pay systems 83 -which were unlike the secretive
discriminatory pay practices in Ledbetter's case-the Court held that
Ledbetter's failure to file an administrative discrimination claim within 180
days from the date the discriminatory pay-setting decision was made
precluded her from bringing her claim.84
Analogizing Ledbetter's pay-discrimination claim to discrete
discriminatory acts, such as termination 85 or denial of tenure,86 the Court
distinguished Bazemore from Ledbetter. 87 Noting that Goodyear's pay
system was neutral on its face and not adopted "in order to discriminate," 88
the majority found that the paychecks issued during the charging period were
merely the effect of discriminatory acts that occurred outside the period and
did not support a timely cause of action.89 In support of its decision not to
treat each paycheck as a discrete discriminatory employment practice, the
Court emphasized the importance of protecting the employer from "stale
claims."90
B. Ginsburg's Dissent
The Ledbetter dissent, issued by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized the
Court's failure to comprehend the insidious way that women can be victims
of pay discrimination. 91 Drawing attention to the "real world" context in
which pay discrimination occurs, Ginsburg emphasized how pay
discrimination is cumulative over time, and in addition, how employees are
not likely to inquire into the salaries of coworkers or are forbidden from
doing so, thereby making it almost impossible for an employee to ever bring
a Title VII claim within the I 80-day filing period.92
82 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 62 1.
83 Id. at 634.
84 Id. at 628-29.
85 See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554 (1977).
86 See Del. State Coil. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 250 (1980).
87 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633-37.
8 8 Id. at 637.
89 Id. at 63 9-40.
90 Id. at 63 1.
91 Id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92 Id.; see also Deborah L. Brake, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 873-74 (2008) (discussing statutes of limitations as applied
to Title V11, emphasizing how Title VII's doctrines place unrealistic expectations and
pressure on employees to recognize and challenge discrimination quickly).
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In contrast to the majority, the dissent emphasized why Morgan's
discrete act analysis should not apply to pay discrimination: unlike acts of
"termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal to hire,"9 3 pay
discrimination does not fall into the "discrete acts" category as an "easy to
identify" act.94 Grounding analysis in "the realities of the workplace," Justice
Ginsburg explained that unlike promotions, transfers, hirings, and firings,
which are generally public events where "an employee can immediately seek
out an explanation and evaluate [the decision] for pretext," compensation
discrimination and its resulting disparities are often "hidden from sight."195 In
addition to the fact that employee compensation is often kept private by
employers, 96 thereby preventing salary comparisons, pay disparities often
occur in small increments such that "cause to suspect that discrimination is at
work develops only over time." 97 Thus, Justice Ginsburg argued that
Morgan's discrete act analysis does not apply because pay discrimination is
not a fully communicated discrete act-like termination, failure to promote,
or refusal to hire-as nothing in Ledbetter's case would have placed her on
notice of an adverse discriminatory decision, prompting her to file an
administrative claim.98
93 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).
94 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95 Id.
96 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2 1, at 26 (noting that a denial of a raise is
not grounds for filing an EEOC charge and that it is not uncommon for employee pay
levels to be kept confidential or for workers to be reluctant to share salary information
with each other) (citing Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure.
Salary? No Way" Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 167, 171 (2004) (contrasting the prevalence of workplace norms and rules against
discussing salaries with the fact that only one in ten employers have actively adopted
"pay openness" policies)).
97 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98 Id; see also Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equality and Institutional
Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 (2009) ("Research indicates that it is often very
difficult for employees to recognize when they have experienced discrimination. At the
individual level, social psychologists have documented the tendency of victims to
minimize events and to resist perceiving and acknowledging bias, even when they
experience behavior that objectively qualifies as discrimination."); Adrienne Colella et
al., Exposing Pay Secrecy, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 55, 57 (2007) (citing a poll in which
36 percent of surveyed employers "prohibited discussion of pay"); Charles Stangor et al.,
Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 69, 73 (2002) (discussing how "the costs of reporting discrimination are
particularly salient when the social context includes members of another social
category").
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Arguing that precedent established that the "paycheck accrual rule"
applied in pay discrimination cases,99 Justice Ginsburg emphasized how pay
discrimination claims "have a closer kinship to hostile work environment
claims than to charges of a single episode of discrimination."'100 Justice
Ginsburg analogized pay discrimination to Morgan, in which the
discrimination accumulates over time and "cannot be said to occur on any
particular day," but "occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in
direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act . .. may not be actionable on its
own." 10' Supporting the analogy to a hostile work environment claim and
speaking to the majority's concern of protecting the employer from "stale
claims," 102 Justice Ginsburg noted that in a case like Ledbetter's,
management should have been on notice of the existence of the
discriminatory conduct considering the persistence of its occurrence:
producing a cognizable harm.103 Moreover, Ginsburg noted that "[d]octrines
such as 'waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling' 'allow us to honor Title
VII's remedial purpose without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."" 04
Frustrated by the additional roadblock the majority's holding placed on
achieving equality, Justice Ginsburg concluded the reading of her dissent by
issuing a challenge to Congress to fix the Court's mistake, stating: "[o~nce
again, the ball is in Congress' [sic] court."105 Taking Ginsburg's challenge,
Congress enacted the LLFPA to ensure "that victims of pay discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin, disability, or age are
entitled to justice with each paycheck." 106
9 9 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Bazemore and
lower court cases).
100 Id at 648.
101 Id. (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002)).
102 See id at 63 1-32 (majority opinion).
103 Id. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Chamallas, supra note 98, at 1045
(discussing Ginsburg's dissent and how Goodyear knew or should have known about the
pay disparities and yet apparently did nothing to address and correct the situation in the
nearly twenty years that Ledbetter worked for Goodyear).
104 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 12 1).
105 Id. at 661 ("Once again, the ball is in Congress' [sic] court. As in 1991, the
Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VIl."); see also
Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of George Miller, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Educ. & Labor).
106 Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of George Miller,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Education and Labor).
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V. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
"Reason-andjustice-demand a different result. "107
The Supreme Court's sharp distinction between "discrete acts" of
discrimination and the "continuing effects" of past violations' 08 influenced
hundreds of subsequent court decisions,'109 impeding justice by allowing
statutes of limitations to be "twisted by courts to limit the scope and thrust of
civil rights laws." 110 Lilly Ledbetter's personal story, and the injustices
perpetuated by the Ledbetter decision, provided the impetus for "women to
push back on the dominant norms of the Court's conservative majority and to
elaborate their own stories." II Advocates pushed for the law's
acknowledgement of the various forms of sex discrimination in our society,
including the acknowledgement of both subtle and blatant discriminatory
acts.1 112
Responding to the events and circumstances surrounding the Ledbetter
decision,"13 Congress acted to correct the Court's narrow interpretation of
10 1]d at 4.
108 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638-40 (finding that receiving a paycheck that perpetuates
the effects of pay decisions made in the past does not violate the law when an employer's
recent actions have no discriminatory purpose).
109 See Robert Pear, Justices' Ruling in Discrimination Case May Draw Quick
Action by Obama, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2009, at Al 13 (reporting that courts around the
country cited the Ledbetter decision hundreds of times as a reason for rejecting lawsuits
claiming discrimination based on race, sex, age, and disability, without regard to the
underlying merits of the individual cases, including cases involving Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Title IX).
110 See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 2008) (Pregerson, J. &
Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (responding to the majority's finding that while the plaintiff
filed suit within two years of renting the apartment, he failed to timely challenge the
"discriminatory housing practice," which began running ten years earlier when
construction of the building was complete); see also Pear, supra note 109, at A 13
(identifying federal cases applying Ledbetter and reversing prior decision in favor of the
employer).
I"I See Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REv. 4, 42
(2008) (ascribing the credit to Justice Ginsburg's provocative dissenting opinion).
112 See Collins, supra note 2; see also Chamallas, supra note 98, at 1038 (noting the
deep understanding of gender bias present in Ginsburg's opinions, which merits her
reputation as a judicial champion of gender equality).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 110-237, at 32-33 (2007). The House Report noted that the
Ledbetter decision was almost immediately met with criticisms from plaintiffs'
advocates; the trial bar, and others in the civil rights community, claiming:
[T]he decision represented a radical departure from established law validating the
"paycheck rule." The Supreme Court's decision "severely weakens remedies for
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Title VIII14 by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (LLFPA).115 With its
enactment, Congress attempted to "strike the right balance" between the
employer and employee interests in Title V1I claims without tipping the
balance too far in either one's favor. 116 Finding that the Ledbetter decision
significantly impaired statutory protections against discrimination in
compensation, Congress adopted the LLFPA to codify the "paycheck accrual
rule" in discriminatory pay claims.' 17 With its codification, the time period
for filing a pay discrimination charge with the EEOC' 1 8 now restarts each
time an employee receives a paycheck reflecting a discriminatory pay
decision. 119 The LLFPA amends the existing statutory filing period for Title
employees who have faced wage discrimination and represents a flawed
interpretation of our civil rights laws," said the National Women's Law Center. "Not
only does the ruling ignore the reality of pay discrimination, it also cripples the
law's intent to address it, and undermines the incentive for employers to prevent and
correct it. "The National Partnership for Women & Families described the decision
as "a painful and costly step backward for the nation and a deep disappointment to
those of us who want to see strong measures in place to give all workers meaningful
protections against discrimination."
Id.
114 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(l), 123 Stat. 5,
5 (2009).
115 See id. (citing the decision specifically, stating: "The Supreme Court in Ledbetter
... significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for
decades."); see also S. REP. No. 92-415, at 6 (197 1) (stating that, consistent with the 1971
amendments, Congress intended Title V1I to address the economic harm-and the
resulting social effects-from discrimination in pay).
1 16 Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 5-6 (statement of Howard P. "Buck"'
McKeon, Senior Republican Member, H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor).
117 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (West 2010) (appearing in "Revision Notes and
Legislative Reports").
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
119 See 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006 & Supp. 20 10). The LLFPA applies to: the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006); the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-97 (2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-300 (2006), but not the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). To
bring an EPA claim, the plaintiff must have a comparator of "equal work," which is not
required to bring a compensation claim for sex discrimination under Title V11. I
addition, "Title VII requires a showing of intent. In practical effect, 'if the trier of fact is
in equipoise about whether the wage differential is motivated by gender discrimination,'
Title VH compels a verdict for the employer, while the EPA compels a verdict for the
plaintiff." Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 2 CHARLEs A. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, & REBECCA HAMN4ER
WHITE, EMPLoYMENT DIsCRiMiNATioN: LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.08[IF][3], at 532 (3d ed.
2002)).
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VII and other federal discrimination laws 120 by codifying the "paycheck
accrual rule":
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination
in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part
from such a decision or other practice.'12 1
In addition to codifying the "paycheck accrual rule," the LLFPA applies
retroactively to claims pending on or after May 28, 2007, the day before the
Supreme Court issued the Ledbetter decision. 122 Congress also authorized
recovery of back-pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the EEOC
charge for employees making a successful discriminatory compensation
decision claim under the LLFPA. 12 3
While the LLFPA remedies the injustice created by the Ledbetter
decision, the courts' broad interpretation and application of the statute creates
a similar injustice for employers. The majority's holding in Ledbetter failed
to recognize the realities of wage discrimination, requiring an employee to
file a complaint with the EEOC under circumstances in which it would be
impossible to know that a discriminatory decision had been made, thereby
diminishing an employee's power to bring a claim. The LLFPA was enacted
to remedy this imbalance of power. However, courts' subsequent
interpretation of the Act has created a power shift in the opposite direction,
against the employer. 124 The inconsistent approach to interpreting the
120 See discussion and statutes cited supra note 119.
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
122 Id. § 2000e-5 note; Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 6,
123 Stat. 5, 7 (2009).
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B); H.R. REP. No. 110-237, at 19 (2007) ("This
section is added to ensure that back pay in cases such as Ledbetter are not limited to 180
days. The statute of limitations period and the back pay recovery period are two separate
periods in the Act."); see also Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty., 583 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Third Circuit decision creates the impression that the recovery period is limited to
300 days rather than two years, but upon review the Mikula court was faced with a statute
of limitations issue and not a limitation on recovery of back-pay. Mikula, 583 F.3d at
186-87.
124 See Jason R. Bent, "f~at the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Doesn't Do: 'Discrete
Acts' and the Future of Pattern or Practice Litigation, 33 RUTGERs L. REc. 31, 37 (2009)
(noting that a legislative solution should attempt "to strike an appropriate balance
between the legitimate interests of employers in obtaining reasonable repose from stale
2010] 263
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LLFPA stems from the statute's inclusion of "other practice" and in some
instances has created a broadening of the 180-day filing period for claims
other than "discriminatory compensation decisions." 25
VI. THE COURTS' INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF THE LILLY
LEDBETTER FAR PAY ACT
After the amendment of the LLFPA, the statute of limitations for federal
discrimination statutes now defines an "unlawful employment practice" as
occurring every time an employee is subject "to a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice,"' 26 with a new claim occurring each
time the employee receives a paycheck affected by an earlier "discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice."'127 Congress enacted the LLFPA to
abrogate the Ledbetter decision, 128 allowing employees to bring a claim for
pay discrimination as long as they receive one paycheck affected by a
discriminatory pay decision within the limitations period but to otherwise
leave the existing case law alone.' 29 The statute's language, "compensation
decision or other practice," leaves open the question of whether "other
practices" include the types of "discrete acts" identified in Morgan-
"termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire"' 30-
which would otherwise require an individual to file a charge of
discrimination within 180 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to
recover for it.13 1
Not surprisingly, courts have taken the language, "compensation decision
or other practice," and interpreted it differently. Some, expressing the same
concerns as those opposed to the bill's initial intrductjon,132 have refused to
claims and the competing interests of plaintiffs in having a reasonable opportunity to
learn of the discriminatory nature of the employment decision that affected them").
125 See cases cited infra note 153.
126 Section 2000e- 16(f) expressly states that, at least with respect to claims against
the federal government, § 2000e-5(e)(3) applies only "to complaints of discrimination in
compensation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(f) (2006).
127 Id. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).
128 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5, 5
(2009) ("The Supreme Court in Ledbetter ... significantly impairs statutory protections
against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have been
bedrock principles of American law for decades.").
129 See id.
13 0 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).
131 Id
132 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 283-LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF
2007 (2007). ("[T]he bill far exceeds the stated purpose of undoing the Court's decision
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read "other practices" to reach the discrete decisions of promotion or
termination 33 while others have allowed previously time-barred employment
decisions that indirectly affect compensation but are not themselves
considered "compensation decisions" to be included.' 34 The courts' failure to
apply a universal analytical framework creates instability and inconsistency
in discriminatory pay decisions, with the broader reading taken by some
courts having a detrimental effect on the employment relationship and, in
turn, the economy.135 The LLFPA was enacted to correct the Court's narrow
interpretation in Ledbetter,136 but the broader reading of "other practices"
breathes new "life into prior, uncharged discrimination"137 and is contrary to
both the policy justifications offered in Justice Ginsburg's dissent' 38 and
Congress's intent'I39-tipping the balance too far in the employee's favor.'140
in Ledbetter by extending the expanded statute of limitations to any 'other practice' that
remotely affects an individual's wages, benefits, or other compensation in the future. This
could effectively waive the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims (such as
promotion and arguably even termination decisions) traditionally regarded as actionable
only when they occur.").
133 See cases cited infra note 152.
134 See cases cited infra note 153.
135 See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations:
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REv. 454, 464-65 (1993) (noting that statutes of
limitations help to provide predictability in our economy, which in turn has a stabilizing
effect on conmmercial and property transactions by allowing employers to plan and
arrange commercial transactions accordingly).
136 See H.R. REP'. No. 110-23 7, at 3 (2007) (stating that the Act "seeks to reverse the
Supreme Court's May 29, 2007, [sic] ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, which
dramatically restricted the time period for filing pay discrimination claims under Title VII
and made it more difficult for workers to stand up for their basic rights at work").
13 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 619 (2007).
138 Id at 650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining the justification for
"separating pay claims from the discrete employment actions identified in Morgan").
Notably, Justice Ginsburg emphasized how an employer gains from sex-based pay
disparities in a way it does not from a discriminatory denial of promotion, hiring, or
transfer, stating:
When a male employee is selected over a female for a higher level position,
someone still gets the promotion and is paid a higher salary; the employer is not
enriched. But when a woman is paid less than a similarly situated man, the employer
reduces its costs each time the pay differential is implemented.
Id.
13 See H.R. REP. No. 110-237, at 7 (2007). Due to the fact that "pay discrimination
is rarely accompanied by circumstances suggestive of bias . .. [ujnlike hiring, firing,
promotion and demotion decisions where an individual immediately knows that she has
suffered an adverse employment action," the Act is necessary to prevent injustice, as in
Ledbetter's case. Id
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A. "Breath[ing] Life Into Prior, Uncharged Discrimination"'14 '
Easily identifiable, discrete employment decisions, such as terminations,
promotions, demotions, and transfers, all typically entail a change in an
employee's pay rate, putting an employee on notice that the decision may be
pretextual for discrimination. 142 Allowing an employee to bring a pay
discrimination claim that is a result of one of these fuilly communicated
discrete acts, which, unlike the secretive nature of Ledbetter's pay
discrimination, are overt and easily identifiable, effectively rejects the
holding of Morgan and establishes the "continuing effects" doctrine as
law.'143
Courts' interpreting "other practices" to include easily identifiable,
discrete acts 144 broadens the reach of the LLFPA beyond what Congress
intended and places the employer at an unfair disadvantage. For example, the
district court in Gentry v. Jackson State University, expansively reading the
LLFPA, found that "it can hardly be denied that the denial of tenure was a
'discrete' act of which plaintiff was obviously aware," 145 but because the
plaintiff asserted that "the denial of tenure also denied her a salary increase,"
the plaintiffs claim was a "compensation decision" within the meaning of
the LLFPA.146 This interpretation of the LLFPA does not take into account
the distinction between discrete acts, which are obvious and, therefore, place
an employee on notice that the pay decision could be a pretext for
140 See Ledbetter House Hearing, supra note 14, at 6 (Howard P. "Buck" McKeon,
Senior Republican Member, H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor) (noting that the purpose of the
Act is to "strike the right balance without tipping it too far toward employers and
employees").
141 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 619 (syllabus) (justifying its rejection of Ledbetter's pay
discrimination claim).
142 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)
(establishing a non-exhaustive list of discrete acts: termination, failure to promote, denial
of transfer, or refusal to hire, and requiring an individual to file a charge within 180 days
of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover).
143 See id at 109 (noting that by "choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines,
Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of
employment discrimination"); see also Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630 (quoting the same
language from Morgan); Bent, supra note 124, at 36 (discussing Ledbetter and the
competing interests of employers and employees).
14 See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 527 (noting that one factor in LLFPA achieving its
full potential will depend on how the courts interpret "other practices"').
14 Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
14 6 Id. (emphasis added).
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discrimination-the type of covert discrimination suffered by Ledbetter-
which the Act is intended to remedy.'147
The plaintiff in Gentry was an associate professor who was denied tenure
in 2004 but did not file a claim of sex discrimination with the EEOC until
2006.148 The court found the denial of tenure qualified as a "compensation
decision" or "other practice" affecting compensation within the meaning of
the LLFPA, which allowed the plaintiff to pursue the otherwise "stale"
claim. 14 9 Thus, the court allowed the plaintiff's argument-that the denial of
tenure prevented a salary increase and, was a compensation decision
negatively affecting the plaintiffs compensation-to prevail two years after
the overt and discrete act occurred. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$100,000 on claims that the university retaliated against her in violation of
Title VII by placing her on a non-tenure job track and by not allowing her to
chair dissertation committees after she complained of sex discrimination.'150
While the jury rejected Gentry's sex discrimination claim for denial of tenure
and related salary increase, it awarded her the total amount of damages she
requested for all three claims. 15 1
B. Interpreting the LLFPA Narrowly
Some district courts have distinguished discrete discriminatory acts, such
as failure-to-promote claims from compensation claims, finding such claims
time-barred under LLFPA if the plaintiff does not file an EEOC complaint
within 180 days of the discriminatory action. 152
147 See H.R. REP. No. 110-237, at 3 (2007).
148 Gentry, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
150 See Retaliation: Jury Awards $100,000 to Professor Claiming Sex Bias
Complaints Led to Non-Tenured Job, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 226, at A-7 (Nov. 27,
2009), available at http://news.bna.com/dlln/ (follow "News Archive" hyperlink; then
click through " 11/27/2009" and "News" in the drop-down menu).
151 See id The "three claims" referred to by the author are the plaintiff s retaliation
claim, promotion claim, and compensation claim. Id.
152 See Grant v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., No. 06 Civ 5755(JGK), 2009 WTL 2263795,
at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (rejecting the application of the Fair Pay Act to failure-
to-promote claims); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 632 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C.
2009) (holding that the Act revives claims of pay lower than that of similarly situated
employees, but not retaliation claims); Chelgren v. S. Holland Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 07
C 6931, 2009 WL 1789350, at *9 (N.D. 111. June 24, 2009) (holding that failure to
promote qualifies as a discrete act of discrimination and it is untimely when it occurs
more than 300 days before an EEOC charge was filed); Richards v. Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., Civ. Action No. 05-3663 (KSH), 2009 WL 1562952, at *9 (D.N.J. June 2, 2009)
(holding that the claim that the employer had failed to hire the plaintiff for more
advanced positions was not revived by the Act because the LLFPA "does not save
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Unlike the court's interpretation in Gentry, some courts have recognized
the important distinction between fully communicated, discrete
discriminatory acts, and the insidious, subtle acts that the LLFPA is intended
to target.'15 3 in Bush v. Orange County Corr. Dep 't, the female African-
American plaintiffs believed their 1990 transfers were promotions, but
learned sixteen years later that the transfers were documented by their
employer as voluntary demotions that had reduced their pay without their
knowledge. 154 The court found that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the
LLFPA and were not administratively time-barred because the plaintiffs filed
their complaint within 180 days of their last discriminatory paycheck.' 55
The LLFPA showing that was intended to remedy the type of
"compensation decision or other practice" in Ledbetter is analogous to the
situation in Bush but inconsistent with Gentry.'156 The approach in Gentry
places a great burden on the employer to defend what, if not for
otherwise untimely claims outside the discriminatory compensation context"); Rowland
v. Certainteed Corp., Civ. Action No. 08-3671, 2009 WL 1444413, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May
21, 2009) (holding that the LLFPA does not cover the ongoing consequences from the
denial of a promotion because that would "eliminate any statute of limitations with
respect to reporting discrimination [in promotion] to the appropriate agency, a change in
law not found in the Ledbetter Act"); Vuong v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ.
1075(TPG), 2009 WL 306391, at *7-..9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2009) (holding that the failure-
to-promote claims were time-barred, but applying the LLFPA to the discriminatory
compensation claim).
153 See Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty., 583 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding the
failure to answer the request for a raise was timely under the LLFPA); Shockley v.
Minner, Civil Action No. 06-478 JJF, 2009 WL 866792, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2009)
(applying the LLFPA to find the failure-to-promote claim timely); Gertskis v. New York
City Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 07 Civ. 2235(TPG), 2009 WL 812263, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2009) (finding the claim for discriminatory failure to promote
plaintiff to the Associate Chemist position timely); Gilmore v. Macy's Retail, No. 06-
3020(JBS). 2009 WL 305045, at *2-..3 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2009) (finding a failure-to-promote
claim timely under the LLFPA, but unsuccessful on the merits).
15 Bush v. Orange Cnty. Corr. Dep't, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
155 Id. at 1296 (finding the claim timely, but unsuccessful on the merits).
156 In addition to the federal courts' inconsistent interpretations, state courts have
diverged when deciding whether or not the LLFPA applies to state law. Compare Klebe
v. Univ. of Tex. Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 568, 571 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (reading the LLFPA to
apply to state anti-discrimination laws without state legislature amending state statutes),
with Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 983 A.2d 1128, 1136-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) ("[T]here is some merit for the proposition that we should not follow Ledbetter.
However, we believe that we would be more faithful to our state jurisprudence by
following Ledbetter, particularly in the absence of a post-Ledbetter amendment to LAD.
We thus follow Title VII and LAD jurisprudence as it stood at all relevant times because
no amendments have been made to the LAD which would affect its construction at the
time when Ledbetter was decided.").
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compensation being interconnected with the promotion, would be a stale
claim in a case where the ftilly communicated decision not to promote should
have placed the employee on notice that she had been subjected to a
discriminatory pay decision at the time it was made.157 Support showing that
Congress intended the LLFPA to apply in a broader context than situations
similar to Ledbetter's is unfounded and contrary to the explicit language
appearing in the statute. 158 While the threat of this expansive interpretation of
the Act forces employers to assess their employee review practices and
develop clear guidelines to measure performance of their employees, which
is arguably beneficial to both the employer and employee,' 59 it also places a
tremendous burden on the employer to defend against stale claims. 16 0
157 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 650-51 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted the differences between failure-to-
promote and compensation claims:
[Sileparating pay claims from the discrete employment actions identified in Morgan,
an employer gains from sex-based pay disparities in a way it does not from a
discriminatory denial of promotion, hiring, or transfer. When a male employee is
selected over a female for a higher level position, someone still gets the promotion
and is paid a higher salary; the employer is not enriched.
Id (emphasis added).
158 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(l), 123 Stat. 5, 5
(2009) ("The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly
restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover
for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of
Congress.").
159 See KATHERINE C. NAuF, To LOOK LIKE AMERICA: DISMANTLING BARRIERS FOR
WOMEN AND NOaRrTIES IN GOvERNMENT 197-98 (2001) (identifying the "[rle-
examination of the organization's structure, culture, and management systems" as an
approach to effectively manage diversity in the workplace).
160 See Robin E. Shea et al., The Impact of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
in ASPATORE SPECIAL REPORT 17 (2009) (highlighting the financial and social
ramification the Act will likely have on businesses); Bent, supra note 124, at 36 (noting
"1employers will face difficultly in gathering, preserving, and presenting the evidence
necessary to defend against . .. claims" of "discrete act[s] of discrimination taking place
years ago"); see also Ledbetter Senate Hearing, supra note 72, at 49 (prepared statement
of Hon. Michael B. Enzi, Member, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions).
Senator Enzi addressed the policy reason for statute of limitations, stating:
First, a statute of limitations encourages the prompt and vigorous pursuit of
important protected righ~ts. This is particularly true in the instance of employment
discrimination. ... [Tihe drafters [of Title VII] adopted a relatively short limitations
period to ensure the quick eradication of discriminatory workplace practices.
Statutes of limitation are designed to encourage the prompt resolution of contested
claims; and, this is particularly important in the context of employment
discrimination claims. An unresolved allegation or suspicion of discrimination is
particularly corrosive in the workplace where the parties to a potential claim are in
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C. The Necessity of a Fact-Intensive Analysis
Balancing the interests of both the employee and employer, the LLFPA
is intended to apply to "discrimination in compensation" cases only, not to
"discrete personnel decisions, like promotions and discharges."16 1 The Act
was intended to address the unfair result in Ledbetter, where the plaintiff had
no way of knowing she was suffering from a discriminatory pay decision-
receiving lower pay than males in the same position. 162 Therefore, it is
necessary for a court to determine whether the plaintiff in a particular case
was subject to discrimination similar to Ledbetter's, in which he or she had
no way of knowing of the discriminatory act at the time the discrimination
occurred, in order to determine if the Act should apply. The Act is not
intended to apply to situations where employees are aware, or should be
aware, of a pretextual discriminatory act and its subsequent effects on pay,
yet fail to file a claim within the 180-day period. To allow such claims under
the LLFPA exposes employers to otherwise time-barred complaints,
encouraging employees to abuse the system by waiting to file claims until an
employer may no longer have documentation available to defend itself. This
interpretation undermines the balance Congress struck between the interests
of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society as a whole when enacting the
LLFPA.163
As Justice Ginsburg established in the Ledbetter dissent, and Congress
reaffirmed when enacting the LLFPA, requiring the plaintiff to file a
discrimination claim within 180 days of the discriminatory pay decision is
unjust in some cases because certain forms of pay discrimination are difficult
to detect, with victims only discovering pay discrepancy over time.164 It was
daily contact, and where the potential claim has effect, both direct and indirect, on
everyone in the workforce. The drafters wisely determined that such matters cannot
be allowed to fester, and should be addressed promptly and resolved as quickly as
possible.
Id
161 See 155 CONG. REC. S739, S757 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Mikulski) (expressing concern that the bill "could apply to discrete personnel decisions,
like promotions and discharges. That's not true. The bill specifically says that it is
addressing 'discrimination in compensation.' That limiting language means that it already
only covers such claims-nothing more, nothing less.").
162 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(2), 123 Stat. 5, 5
(2009) ("The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory
compensation claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the
robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.").
163 See supra Part 1H (discussing statute of limitations policy).
16 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649-51 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Ledbetter Senate Hearing, supra note 72, at 16-17
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unfair to begin running the 180-day filing period from the day the original
compensation decision was made in Ledbetter' s case because the
comparative information necessary to assess pay disparities, suggesting
discrimination, "is often hidden from the employee's view." 165 Addressing
the differences between pay discrimination and other overt, discrete acts,
Justice Ginsburg specifically noted: "Pay disparities are .. . significantly
different from adverse actions 'such as termination, failure to promote,.... or
refusal to hire,' all involving fully communicated discrete acts, 'easy to
identify' as discriminatory."16 6 Therefore, the LLFPA needs to be applied in
a uniform manner in order to ensure that courts do not interpret it broadly to
include' these fully communicated, easy-to-identify discrete acts of
discrimination.
V1I. SOLUTION: THREE-STEP ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Title VII requires a claim to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of a
discriminatory act.167 The EEOC filing requirement is analogous to a statute
of limitations, barring all claims arising outside the 180-day filing period. In
order to preserve the balance of the employee and employer interests struck
by -the EEOC filing requirement, 168 it is necessary to establish a predictable
analytical framework to determine a claim's timeliness. This framework
entails a three-step process (the Three-Step Analytical Framework) for
determining whether a discrimination claim meets the 180-day filing
requirement: (1) classifying the claims into one of three categories-a
discrete act, a hostile work environment claim, or a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice; (2) based on the step-one category,
identifying the applicable statute or case precedent; and (3) applying the
statute or case precedent to determine the timeliness of the claim.
To understand how this framework leads to a consistent application of
Supreme Court precedent and the LLFPA discussed in Parts III and VI of this
Note, it is necessary to first explain each step separately and then to apply the
framework to a hypothetical discrimination claim.
(statement of Samuel R. Bagenstos, Professor of Law & Associate Dean, Washington
University) ("[Elmployees are unlikely to know that they have gotten paid less than their
co-workers. They are unlikely to attribute differences in pay to discrimination, and they
are unlikely to bring a lawsuit after the initial discriminatory pay decision even if they do
know they have been the victims of discrimination because of the small stakes of any
incremental pay discrimination decision.").
165 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16 6 Id. (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)).
167 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (2006).
168 See supra Part III (discussing statute of limitations policy).
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A. Step One: Classifying the Claims into One of Three Categories
To correctly categorize a discriminatory compensation decision into one
of three categories-a discrete act, a hostile work environment claim, or a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice-it is necessary to
disentangle a compensation claim from other claims of discrimination in a
particular case. After the enactment of the LLFPA, the courts' diffiCulty16 9 in
correctly categorizing discriminatory pay claims stems from a failure to take
this first step of identify'ing, and then separately analyzing, the discriminatory
compensation claim.
A discrimination claim falls into the category of a "discrete act," as
distinguished from a hostile work environment or discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, if the discriminatory act is public
and has been fully communicated.'17 0 Acts such as promotions, transfers,
hirings, and firings are discrete acts because they are generally known by
coworkers and place an individual employee on notice that discrimination
could be involved. In contrast, a "hostile work environment" claim does not
entail one discrete act, but requires a series of individual acts taken together
to create an "environent."171 A "hostile work environment" does not fall
under the discrete act category because the actionable wrong is the
environment, not the individual acts. 172 Finally, a claim falls under the third
category of a "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice" if an
employer pays a different wage, or provides different benefits, to similarly
situated employees. 173
Therefore, when categorizing a discrimination claim under Step One, it is
necessary to determine whether the allegation involves: (a) a fully
communicated discrete public act; (b) an act that, when coupled with other
acts, creates a hostile work environment; or (c) a claim of pay disparity when
compared to similarly situated employees.
169 See supra Part VI.
170 See supra Part HII.
171 See supra Part 111.
172 See supra Part 111.
173 See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting
that a prima facie case of "discrimination in compensation" under Title VH involves
showing plaintiff "was paid less than a non-member [of the protected class] for work
requiring substantially the same responsibility"); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 338
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (plaintiff alleging "wage discrimination" under Title VH must show he
was "performing work substantially equal to that of ... employees ... compensated at
higher rates" (internal quotation marks omitted)); MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo,
922 F.2d 766, 774 (11 th Cir. 199 1) (proof of "discrimination in compensation" under
ADEA requires showing "similarly situated persons outside the protected age group
received higher wages").
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B. Step Two: Identifying the Applicable Statute or Case Precedent
After categorizing the discrimination claim, the task of identify'ing and
applying the applicable case precedent or statute is straightforward. If
categorized as a "discrete act," Morgan applies with the discrete act
triggering the 180-day filing period.'174 If categorized as a "hostile work
environment," Morgan also applies, but the 180-day filing period is
measured from the most recent discriminatory act constituting the claim.' 75
Finally, if the claim involves discriminatory compensation, the LLFPA
applies and the 180-day filing period begins to run from the day of the last
paycheck reflecting discriminatory compensation.'176
C. Step Three:~ Applying the Applicable Statute or Case Precedent to
the Facts
The third step in the analytical framework requires the application of the
statute or case precedent based on the category of the claim. In order to
provide a thorough explanation of the proposed framework, it is necessary to
establish a hypothetical scenario to complete the third step of applying case
precedent or the LLFPA to the facts of a case.
Using, in part, a district court case as the basis for our facts, 17 7 the
hypothetical involves a sex-based Title VII discrimination claim. Sally, a
female sales representative working for a pharmaceutical company, alleges
that male employees in the same position receive a higher salary and larger
bonuses. In addition, Sally claims her employer promoted a male, instead of
Sally, to regional manager because of her gender on February 20, 2009. She
learned of the higher salaries and larger bonuses only recently when someone
left an anonymous tip on her desk. The tip informed Sally that she was
initially hired over fifteen years ago at a lower salary than men in the same
position and with her same experience and, in addition, she discovered that
she had received lower bonuses than her male counterparts even though she
consistently outperformed them by all measures. The bonuses had been
allocated over the last fifteen years, with the last bonus given in December of
2007. No one received a bonus in 2008 because the economy was so poor
and the company was struggling. Sally filed a claim with the EEOC upon
receiving the tip on December 15, 2009.
In order to determine if Sally's claim is timely within the 180-day filing
174 See supra Part 111.
175 See supra Part 111.
176 See supra Part V.
177 See Harris v. Auxilium Pharm., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 711, 744-47 (S.D. Tex.
2009).
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period, it is necessary to apply the Three-Step Analytical Framework by: (1)
classifying her claims into one of three categories-a discrete act, a hostile
work environment claim, or a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice; (2) based on the category, identifying the applicable statute or case
precedent; and (3) applying the statute or case precedent to determine the
timeliness of the claim. Applying Step One, it must be determined whether
the allegation involves: (a) a fully communicated discrete public act; (b) an
act that, when coupled with other acts, creates a hostile work environment; or
(c) a claim of pay disparity when compared to similarly situated employees.
Based on the facts of the hypothetical, Sally potentially has two claims: a
compensation claim arising from the disparity in her salary and bonuses over
the past fifteen years and a failure-to-promote claim resulting from the
February 20, 2009 decision.
1. Sally 's Compensation Claim: An Application of the LLFPA
Analyzing the compensation claim first, it does not fit into category (a)
as a fuilly communicated discrete public act because Sally was not aware of
the salary and bonus differences until she received the anonymous tip.
Sally's employer is similar to most employers and does not make salary and
bonus schedules public; therefore, the decision to pay Sally less than her
male counterparts, while a discrete act when it was made, was not a fully
communicated public act that would place Sally on notice of discrimination
because of her sex.178 The act of paying Sally a lower starting salary and
smaller bonuses is not an act that, taken with other acts, creates a hostile
work environment claim; therefore, category (b) also does not apply.
However, the salary and bonus decisions are claims of pay disparity, as Sally
is being paid less than similarly situated males. Therefore, Sally's allegation
falls into category (c) as a discriminatory pay decision.
Applying Step Two of the analytical framework; because this is a
discriminatory pay decision, the LLFPA applies to determine whether or not
Sally timely filed her EEOC complaint.
Moving to Step Three and applying the LLFPA to Sally's claim, Sally
meets the filing requirement since she filed her complaint within 180 days of
receiving a paycheck reflecting the discriminatory pay decision. Note,
however, that the conclusion in Sally's case is different than the conclusion
courts would have found if the LLFPA had not been enacted.'179 Without the
LLFPA, Sally's claim would have been time-barred because the filing period
would have started running the day the discriminatory pay decisions were
178 This portion of the facts is similar to the facts in Lilly Ledbetter's case. See
supra Part H1.
179 See supra Part IV.
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made, with the first being over fifteen years ago, and not from the date of her
last paycheck. However even under the LLFPA, Sally cannot recover her
bonuses since those pay decisions were not reflected in a paycheck received
within the last 180 days. While Sally is not completely barred from recovery
for the discriminatory pay under the LLFPA, she is limited to receiving two
years of back pay. 180
2. Sally's Failure-to-Promote Claim: LLFPA Should Not Apply
Moving to Sally's failure-to-promote claim, and applying the Three-Step
Analytical Framework, one must conclude that the LLFPA does not apply.
Analyzing the failure-to-promote claim under Step One, it must be
determined what category the discriminatory act falls under: (a) a fully
communicated discrete public act; (b) an act that, when coupled with other
acts, creates a hostile work environment; or (c) a claim of pay disparity when
compared to similarly situated employees. The failure-to-promote claim
seems to fit best under "category (a)" as a fuilly communicated discrete act.
Sally was aware when the decision was made that she did not receive the
promotion and if it was not announced publicly, she could have easily
discovered that a male was appointed to the position upon realizing she was
not the new regional manager. The decision not to promote Sally, but instead
to place a male in the position, is not a "category (b)" claim because it is not
a part of a larger compilation of acts, creating a hostile work environment.
The challenge in categorizing Sally's failure-to-promote claim is whether it
is a "category (c)" claim, as the decision not to promote Sally likely resulted
in a lost income opportunity.
The challenge this scenario presents is the same challenge district courts
have grappled with since the enactment of the LLFPA: does a failure-to-
promote claim qualify as an "other practice" within the meaning of the Act?
While the decision not to promote Sally likely results in lower pay, it is not a
situation that Sally was unaware of when it occurred. Instead, the decision
was a fully commnunicated discrete act and, therefore, while the decision does
affect Sally's pay, it is not the type of secretive wage discrimination that
Congress intended to protect when enacting the LLFPA. 18 1
To fully understand the implications of recognizing Sally's failure-to-
180 See supra Part V.
181 Congress found that "[tlhe limitation imposed by the Court [in Ledbetter] on the
filing of discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination
and is at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended."
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(2), 123 Stat. 5, 5 (2009)
(emphasis added). Congress is referring to the wage discrimination in Ledbetter, which
was kept secret and left her with no way of discovering the disparity in order to timely
file an EEOC claim.
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promote claim as a fully communicated discrete act, as well as a
discriminatory pay decision under the LLFPA, it is necessary to move to Step
Two of our framework. Under Step Two, the rule established by case
precedent or statute is identified based on the claim's category. In the case of
a fully communicated discrete act, the Morgan decision would apply and
under Step Three, the 180-day filing period would be triggered from the date
the promotion decision was made. Conversely, if the promotion decision is a
discriminatory pay decision, then the LLFPA applies and under Step Three,
the 180-day filing period would be triggered on the date Sally received her
last paycheck reflecting the discriminatory pay.
These two results are at odds with one another and if allowed, would not
only undermine the Court's Morgan analysis, but would also provide the
wrong incentive to employees. If the failure-to-promote claim is allowed
under the LLFPA, even though it qualifies as a fully communicated discrete
act, then instead of encouraging employees to file with the EEOC as soon as
the decision has been made and communicated, employees could wait as
long as they want to bring the claim so long as they continue to receive a
paycheck. This result is not only contrary to what Congress intended in
enacting the LLFPA, it is also contrary to the policy behind the EEOC 180-
day requirement.' 82 It would allow employees to wait to bring a claim, which
not only makes it more difficult for employers to defend against these stale
claims as time passes, it allows potentially discriminatory behavior to go
unchecked because the employer is not held accountable for its unjust actions
as soon as possible, which is what the 180-day requirement helps to
enforce.'18 3
As supported by the policy reasons of the 180-day requirement and
Congress's intent when enacting the LLFPA, Sally's failure-to-promote
claim is not a claim of "discrimination in compensation," but a fully
communicated discrete act triggering the 180-day filing period on the date
the decision was made, February 20, 2009. Applying the reasoning from
Morgan, the effects alone cannot breathe new life into past discrimination,
and Sally is barred from bringing her claim because her EEOC complaint
was filed on December 15, 2009, more than 180 days after she leamned she
failed to receive the promotion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The limitations period of the anti-discrimination statutes are intended to
encourage employees to promptly assert their rights and to protect employers
from the burden of defending against claims arising from employment
182 See supra Part V.
183 See supra Part III.
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decisions that are long past.'184 The ruling in Ledbetter disrupted the balance
struck by the limitations period, and Congress, heeding Justice Ginsburg's
call, shifted the balance back to equilibrium by enacting the LLFPA. The
LLFPA was necessary to prevent injustice in cases like Ledbetter's and was a
reminder that discrimination based on sex is still embedded within society.
Just as the Ledbetter majority failed to recognize the "real world" context to
which the Court applied the law,' 85 resulting in injustice for employees,
some courts are failing to recognize the "real world" context to which they
are applying the LLFPA,186 resulting in injustice for employers. In either
scenario, the failure to analyze the facts of each case leads to a blind
application of the law, preventing the extinguishment of the intended ills the
LLFPA was meant to address. As Justice Ginsburg so pointedly stated:
The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimination with respect to
compensation that Ledbetter suffered does not fit within the category of
singular discrete acts "easy to identify'." A worker knows immediately if she
is denied a promotion or transfer, if she is fired or refused employment. And
promotions, transfers, hirings, and firings are generally public events,
known to co-workers. When an employer makes a decision of such open
and definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an
explanation and evaluate it for pretext. Compensation disparities, in
contrast, are often hidden from sight.'187
Recognizing this important distinction between public and private discrete
acts, Congress enacted the LLFPA to prevent the injustice Ledbetter suffered
from occurring in the future.
In order to protect and preserve the delicate balance of the
employer/employee relationship, courts must recognize the context in which
the LLFPA was enacted to address and apply the Three-Step Analytical
Framework to avoid using the LLFPA as a blunt-force instrument. Courts
must analyze the facts of each case to determine whether or not the
discriminatory act, which resulted in a pay discrepancy, is the type of
184 See Ledbetter Senate Hearing, supra note 72, at 28 (prepared statement of Eric
S. Dreiband, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP) ("[L]imitations periods,
while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert
their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from
employment decisions that are long past." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980))); CoRmAN, supra note 8, §1.1.
185 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
186 See cases cited supra note 153.
18 7 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2010] 277
1278 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
"discriminatory compensation decision or other practice" the LLFPA was
passed to protect.'188
As Justice Ginsburg's dissent makes clear, compensation claims are
fundamentally different from claims based on "discrete acts" because the
discrimination accumulates over an extended period of time: the
discrimination can take years to identify. The same is not true for failure-to-
promote or demotion claims; these "public acts" place an employee on notice
that the decision could be a pretext for discrimination and therefore the
underlying reasoning and policy justification for enacting the LLFPA do not
apply. In fact, by applying the LLFPA to these overt, discrete acts, too much
power is given to the employees to the detriment of the employer, creating an
equally unjust situation as the Court created in Ledbetter. 189
In order to reestablish and maintain the balance of employer/employee
interests that Congress intended when enacting the LLFPA, courts must
disentangle discrete employment acts from the resulting pay discrimination.
Courts must first determine whether the discrete act is secretive, like the act
leading to the pay disparity in Ledbetter, or if it is an overt and public act that
the employee was aware of at the time of its occurrence, similar to the
promotions in Gentry. If the discriminatory act is overt and public, then the
court should apply the Morgan discrete act analysis and deny the plaintiffs
claim if it falls outside the 180-day filing period. If the claim is more like
Ledbetter and Bush, where the discriminatory pay decisions were kept
private and only discoverable over time, then the LLFPA should apply to
prevent injustice. Making the distinction as to whether the initial
discriminatory pay decision stems from an act that is either covert or overt is
essential to enforcing Title VII's statute of limitations in a fair and
predictable way, and necessary to maintain the balance of interests of the
employer, the employee, and society as a whole.
The LLFPA amends the federal anti-discrimination statutes to recognize
the unique challenges of discriminatory compensation claims and the nature
of the workplace in which the claims arise. Reading the Act's terms broadly
to incorporate obvious and discrete acts of discrimination creates a similar
and equally prejudicial effect on employers that the Ledbetter decision
created for employees. Therefore, the distinction as to whether the initial
188 See Bush v. Orange Cnty. Corr. Dep't, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1296-97 (M.D.
Fla. 2009).
189 As Justice Ginsberg noted in the Ledbetter dissent, defenses, such as the defense
of laches, are available to protect employers from stale claims, that have yet to be used.
See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121-22 (2002) (to prove
laches, an employer must demonstrate that (1) there was inexcusable delay on the part of
the plaintiff in bringing the claim; and (2) there is prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay); see also Sullivan, supra note 6, at 38-42 (noting that the defenses will
prove critical for employers under the act).
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discriminatory pay decision stems from an act that is either covert or overt is
essential to establishing the balance necessary to further both the interests of
employer and employees in the context of the "real world" work
environment. This distinction is consistent with the concerns expressed in
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, the statutory language of the LLFPA, and
Congress's intent when enacting the statute. While it requires courts to
analyze the facts of each claim, it is a manageable rule, prevents injustice,
and is consistent with Court precedent. 190
190 This approach reconciles Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete discriminatory acts
must be filed within 180 days from the date of occurrence); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618
("overt" pay decisions are discrete acts triggering the 180-day filing period); and the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5, 5 (2009) (the filing
period for a "covert" discriminatory pay decision is renewed upon receiving a paycheck
reflecting the discrimination).
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